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Towards Regimes for Sustainable Mineral Resource 
Management—Constitutional Reform, Law and 
Judicial Decisions in Latin America
Ana Elizabeth Bastida and Luis Bustos
Abstract
This chapter examines mining legislation trends in Latin America. It focuses on the in-
terpretation of the judicial decisions of the Constitutional Court of Colombia regarding 
conditions and processes for decision-making in the context of mining projects. The 
authors present an initial overview of the economic organisation and the sector legis-
lation model adopted in Bolivia. The chapter anticipates a shift from sectoral regimes, 
which focus on exploration and exploitation, towards regimes for decision-making 
processes that mainstream constitutional principles and legal frameworks that apply 
to managing territories and their natural resources. The emphasis lies on reflecting on 
gaps in legal and institutional design and on corresponding challenges. This includes 
the need to strengthen the capacities of institutions and the actors that participate in 
decision-making processes to advance efforts aimed at furthering  sustainable mineral 
resource management in the region.
1 Introduction
The Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs) adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in September 2015 set the direction for the new global de-
velopment agenda for 2030 and promote advancement towards ‘achiev[ing] 
the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources’ (un, 
2015, sdg 12.2). The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
established the principle that human beings are at the centre of concerns 
with regard to sustainable development and called for public participation 
in  decision-making processes (un, 1992). Sustainable development entails 
 obligations, limits and processes in natural resource management while bal-
ancing divergent environmental, social and economic interests when making 
decisions about economic activities. This encompasses an expansion of the 
 historical dynamics of decision-making in industries (and challenges to the 
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traditional models of sector legislation) that focus on extraction. The process 
of weighing up different criteria requires applying both management and 
planning tools and creating spaces for participation and dialogue among dif-
ferent actors and institutions.
The question of the role and ownership of the state over natural resources 
and the establishment of the main criteria for their use and exploitation have 
played a preponderant role in the significant waves of constitutional reforms 
that have taken place in Latin America since the 1990s—natural resources are 
known to make a decisive contribution to the economies of many countries in 
the region. Aspects concerning the ownership of natural resources and the role 
of the state are usually included in the chapter of the constitution regarding 
the state’s economic organisation and express broader economic and political 
views. One of the most important axes of the constitutional and legislative 
reforms of the 1990s in most Latin American countries aimed at setting the 
bases for market economies and opening up their regimes to international in-
vestment. But this was not the only axis. The other entailed strengthening the 
bases for the rule of law and expanding constitutional charters of rights and 
guarantees in the political context of opening up to democracy. The right to 
a healthy environment and the rights of indigenous peoples were recognised 
(many Latin American countries ratified Convention 169 of the International 
Labour Organization on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries during this period), enshrining sustainable development as the guiding 
principle for natural resource management. At the same time, decentralisa-
tion processes, involving the transfer of functions from the central government 
to subnational political units, were furthered (Yupari, 2005). These trends are 
consistent with, and in some cases have been driven by, intergovernmental or-
ganisations, the World Bank in particular, in the context of reform programmes 
for consolidating the rule of law.
In recent years, several countries—driven in part by the economic boom 
seen in the region due to the unprecedented demand from China and other 
industrialising countries for raw materials—have experimented with more 
heterodox policies, where the state plays a larger role in the economy. In some 
cases, and particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador, changes transcend the econom-
ic sphere and acquire re-foundational characteristics, which are expressed in 
constitutional reforms. In effect, the constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador have 
aligned their structures and the state’s functions with ‘living well’/‘good liv-
ing’ (vivir bien/buen vivir). This concept is rooted in the pluricultural identity 
of each of these countries, and draws a close connection between man and 
nature (Vanhulst and Beling, 2014; Villalba, 2013). Although these processes 
have been considered alternative forms of development—given that they 
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are critical of the Eurocentric view of development—(Acosta, 2010; Escobar, 
2015), both constitutions and sectoral legislation incorporate the concept of 
the sustainable development of natural resources and the more limited term 
‘ sustainable use’ as qualifying non-renewable resource extraction.
Mining laws in the region are deeply rooted in history. A common character-
istic is that the state holds ownership of mineral resources in the subsoil and 
grants exploration and exploitation rights through the so-called concession 
system. Mining has traditionally been considered an activity of public utility 
or public interest—a principle grounded either in ensuring mineral supply as 
minerals are used as basic inputs for the economy, or in the assumption that 
mining can contribute to development. The declaration of the public utility of 
mining expresses the precedence of mineral rights over surface rights, through 
the mineral rights holder’s entitlement to demand expropriation or ease-
ments. In this sense, mining legislation establishes preferential land use and 
a model of territorial management that aims to promote and facilitate mining 
activities.
The question is to what extent sectoral legislation—aligned with multiple 
legal and regulatory regimes and constitutional principles—sets the bases 
for the sustainable management of mineral resources and for promoting 
the role that mining can play in contributing to the objectives of sustainable 
development.
First, our goal is to examine two different approaches to sectoral legisla-
tion, taking into consideration the differentiation drawn by the editorial line 
of this thematic issue, which focuses on the orthodox or heterodox nature 
of the strategies that have been adopted by countries in the region in the 
past few years. Second, our objective is to examine legislative and judicial 
 developments, exploring their scope and the criteria used to align sectoral leg-
islation and constitutional principles. Our analysis focuses on Colombia, poses 
a series of questions regarding Bolivia and comments on aspects relevant to 
the region. On the one hand, Colombia exemplifies the model of economic 
management based on market policies. On the other hand, various issues rela-
tive to sustainable development in mining have been subject to interpreta-
tion by the  Constitutional Court—including the final purpose of the revenues 
generated from non-renewable resources, banning mining from ecologically 
sensitive  areas, and the range of actors involved in the decision-making pro-
cess. The court is recognised in the region for the harmonious interpretation 
of economic clauses and of the charter of rights and guarantees as enshrined 
in the constitution of 1991 with regard to the enforceability of social and envi-
ronmental rights (Uprimny Yepes, 2006; see also Couso, 2006). In the case of 
Bolivia, it has adopted a mixed system of economic management and has also 
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instituted  heterodox approaches with respect to the liberal notions of democ-
racy, participation and governance (Wolff, 2013).
Lastly, our objective is to explore the evolutionary direction of law in this 
area, from sectoral regimes that promote extraction to broader normative 
frameworks that support sustainable resource management, and their con-
tribution to the objectives of sustainable development. Additionally, we seek 
to delineate contextualised resource management models and point out the 
enormous complexity and challenges that are involved in effectively ordering 
and regulating the sustainable development of mineral resources in the region 
(un, 2015, sdg 12.2). Our analysis aims to contribute to debate and to the work 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac) 
regarding a recent regional initiative relative to Natural Resource Governance 
in Latin America, launched in response to the first report on the Sustainable 
Development Goals in 2016 (eclac, 2016).
Regarding the structure and some of the conceptual bases of this chapter, 
the next section describes some of the structural features of systems used to 
grant rights over mineral resources in the region and provides a dynamic per-
spective on their evolution in different political and economic contexts. This 
also serves as the basis for describing sectoral regimes in the countries ana-
lysed. Next, we examine the concept of sustainable development and its appli-
cation in mining according to the United Nations’ documents and resolutions, 
and we point to literature on the role of law in sustainable development (due 
to space constraints, we will not delve into critical literature regarding the no-
tion of development and sustainable development).
As a tool with which to analyse the frequent fragmentation of regimes ap-
plicable to economic, environmental and other matters relative to sustainable 
natural resource management, we rely on the reflections of the distinguished 
jurist Raúl Brañes. Brañes foresaw the need to align the ‘parallel legal sub-
systems’ that exist in Latin America in terms of economic and environmental 
management with the purpose of achieving the shared objective of sustain-
able development. In a piece written a number of years ago, he contended that 
one of the factors that has contributed to problems of application and to the 
inefficiency of environmental law in the region has been ‘the absence of sus-
tainable development concepts in the legal system in general and in economic 
legislation in particular’ (Brañes, ca. 2004). It is not our intention to go into 
a detailed analysis of normative frameworks or to inquire about the conse-
quences that this lack of harmonisation generates within different branches 
of legislation. Instead, we explore the presence of sustainable development 
in sector legislation. These reflections provide us with a useful starting point 
for a  retrospective analysis of the evolution of the integration of different 
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 dimensions of sustainable development in those regimes that apply to mining 
activities.
At the end of our analysis of each country, we anchor our reflections to 
some lines of the literature in order to advance understanding of the context 
and the limits of the legal framework. Lastly, if the focus of mining legisla-
tion has traditionally been on exercising the rights that emanate from terri-
torial sovereignty and on the relationship between the state and the miner 
 (investor), sustainable development—as a final objective of and condition 
for resource  exploitation—shines a light on the duties of the state in manag-
ing said  resources and in expanding the constellation of actors and levels of 
jurisdiction involved. Along these lines, at the end of the chapter we situate 
our  reflections as a facet of internal law in the context of the international 
literature and debates regarding states’ exercise of sovereignty over natural 
resources.
2 Structural and Dynamic Perspectives in Sectoral Legislation 
Regarding Mining in Latin America1
In line with the predominant system in Latin America, states exert ownership 
over the mineral resources in the ground. Juristic writings usually  differentiate, 
using nuances, between two systems for granting exploration rights to extract 
mineral resources. On the one hand, there is the ‘legal concession’ system 
or ‘concession-property’. This is the legacy of the old ordinances that were 
in place during the viceroyalty periods until the countries of the region de-
clared their independence (such as the Ordinances of New Spain–Mexico of 
1783,2 which were in place until the first codes of the new countries came into 
effect).3 According to this system, the concession is granted to the discoverer 
(in recent codes this is the ‘first applicant’) in accordance with objective cri-
teria and non-discretional procedures and for an undefined period as long as 
the conditions necessary to grant and maintain the same are fulfilled. On the 
1 As a reference with which to structure this section, we have used the categorisation drawn up 
by Viñuales (2015), which differentiates between structural and dynamic perspectives when 
examining specific branches of the law.
2 Reales Ordenanzas para la Dirección, Rejimen y Gobierno del Importante Cuerpo de la 
 Minería de Nueva-España y de su Real Tribunal Jeneral de orden de Su Majestad (1783). For 
an in-depth study of Ordinances, see Vergara Blanco (1992) and Vildósola Fuenzalida (1999).




other hand, there is the ‘concession-contract’ system (influenced by European 
mining laws, particularly the French mining law of 1810, which also served as 
material sources in the drafting of the first generation of sectoral legislation in 
the independent countries of the continent), according to which the conces-
sion is granted to the applicant intuitu personae as long as the same fulfils the 
required conditions (which may include standards relative to their technical, 
economic and financial capacity), and is then formalised into a contract. Apart 
from concession systems, the state can opt for directly contracting joint ven-
tures, service contracts, services, or shared risk contracts.
From a dynamic perspective, and given the role of mining in the  economic 
organisation of many of the countries in the region, the legal and regula-
tory regimes adopted in the sector can be interpreted through visions of the 
role of the state and foreign investment in the economy and in predominant 
 political–economic contexts or models of development (Bastida, 2008). The 
changing scenarios at the international level in terms of prices and demand for 
minerals has also had an impact on the formulation of strategies in the sector, 
taking into consideration the fact that Latin America has historically followed 
a pattern of raw material exports. In the 1960s and 1970s, in the conceptual 
framework of the theory of dependence, most Latin American countries im-
plemented policies whereby the state took a leading and assertive role in ex-
ercising its economic sovereignty with regard to natural resource exploitation 
in a context of rising commodity prices. The prevailing notion was that  mining 
could contribute the financial resources needed for development, and thus 
become a ‘springboard to industrialisation’. The initial measures employed to 
ensure the gradual transfer of shares in companies with transnational capital 
were followed by outright nationalisations (as with the Chuquicamata and El 
Teniente deposits in Chile). State companies were created to administer these 
resources (Codelco in Chile, comibol in Bolivia, and Empresa Pública Minera 
del Perú, or Minero-Perú). The central state was the main player in this model. 
In terms of legal instruments, the historic pre-eminence of the mining con-
cession system in the region (‘concession-property’) paved the way for more 
regulated regimes of mineral tenure (such as the administrative concession 
system under the General Law of Mining of Peru (1971)) and the predominant 
use of service and joint venture contracts (Cano, 1977). In this context, Latin 
American countries played a leading role in the initial articulation, and in the 
evolution, of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
within the heart of the United Nations.
Towards the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, in the context of globali-
sation and low commodity prices and following a decade of increased levels of 
foreign borrowing, Latin American countries registered a massive shift towards 
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market policies, opening up to foreign investment and liberalisation.  According 
to the ‘Washington Consensus’—initially directed at Latin  America—these 
policies needed to be implemented prior to accessing financing. At a domestic 
level, the reforms were directed at generating financial resources and paying 
the external debt by launching new projects and privatising state-owned min-
ing companies. The legal map of the sector in the region showed the return 
of traditional mining concessions regimes. Emphasis was placed on objective 
processes for granting and maintaining concessions (to the first applicant un-
der the condition that that applicant pay an initial/annual amount), strength-
ening the status of rights emerging from concessions as real property and legal 
certainty, limitations on the exercise of discretionary powers, and streamlining 
procedures in order to ‘establish enabling environments for investment’ (Van 
der Veen et al., 1996; Bastida, 2008). In the field of investment law, many coun-
tries in the region ratified bilateral investment agreements and reformed their 
laws to promote and protect foreign investment, which implies recourse to in-
ternational arbitration for settling conflicts between investors and states. For-
eign investment regimes entail another  ‘parallel legal  sub-system’ of  economic 
law that prioritises the protection of investors’ interests—but that sub-system’s 
interface with development outcomes and the public interest is coming under 
increasing scrutiny (Viñuales, 2015).
Since investment regimes opened up in the 1990s, Latin America has be-
come a major recipient of international investment. It is important to note 
that in the last few decades the technical modalities of mining operations 
have been transformed by technology, which has made open-pit exploitation 
 feasible—84 per cent of metal mines operate using this method—and uses 
chemical substances in its ore recovery processes. While fiscal revenues can 
provide a powerful injection of revenues and currency into national econo-
mies, the interaction of these projects with the environment, communities 
and local economies has frequently been profoundly problematic. In most 
cases, regulatory and institutional gaps have amplified the impacts, conflicts 
and growing opposition to such projects.
While the focus of sector policies in the 1990s was on establishing enabling 
frameworks for investment, in the next decade attention turned to concerns 
about how to strengthen institutions in resource producing countries to avoid 
the so-called resource curse. The current decade has been marked by debate 
about the potential transformative role that mining could play if linkages with 
other productive sectors were strengthened (Dietsche, 2014). Such an evolu-
tion calls for certain clarifications regarding the remarkable evolution of the 
concept of sustainable development in terms of its application to mining and 
minerals, which will be dealt with briefly in the next section.
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3 Sustainable Development and Its Application in Mining: The Focus 
of Documents Issuing from the United Nations
Our Common Future (the Brundtland Report), published in 1987, contained a 
call to overcome the fragmented vision that saw development and the environ-
ment as separate, and coined the concept of sustainable development, which 
it defined as development that meets the needs of the present generation with-
out compromising the ability of future generations to satisfy their own needs. 
On the one hand, the concept places emphasis on needs, particularly those of 
the most vulnerable; on the other, it posits that there are limits to the environ-
ment’s capacity to meet present and future needs (un, 1987). In a broad sense, 
the concept brings forward an ethical appraisal of the purpose and processes 
of development (Walsh, 2000).
The instruments developed at the United Nations Conference on the En-
vironment and Development (unced) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 consolidated 
the trends initiated in the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and set the guiding 
principles for environmental law and the concepts inherent to the notion of 
sustainable development. While unced’s main concern related to balancing 
environmental protection and economic development, the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 2002 emphasised the so-
cial dimension. The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
(Rio+20), held in 2012, urged to focus their efforts on integrating, and ensuring 
more coherence among, the dimensions of sustainable development and its 
supporting policies and institutions, and stressed the need to eradicate pov-
erty and radically shift consumption and production patterns. It also called for 
the Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs) to be elaborated in such a man-
ner as to subsume the Millennium Development Goals, due in 2015, and to 
consolidate a new development agenda post-2015. The sdgs were approved in 
September 2015.
The question is whether it is possible to reconcile mining with sustain-
able development. In the 1970s, the focus of the debate on non-renewable 
resources was dominated by concern that they would run out. As time went 
on, these concerns shifted to the environmental impacts generated by min-
ing (Tilton, 2003). The idea that mining can be a catalyst for the objectives of 
sustainable development is supported by the concept of ‘capital substitution’ 
developed in the economic literature. The term ‘capital’ comprises all inputs 
of economic activity, including natural capital, human capital, financial and 
manufacturing capital, social capital and cultural capital (Auty and Mikesell, 
1998; Eggert, 2000; Harris, 2001). There is an increased consensus on the fact 
that certain forms of capital are not substitutable. The Johannesburg Plan of 
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Implementation of 2002 advances conceptually with regard to the relation-
ship between mining and sustainable development. It reflects debates positing 
that rather than focusing solely on ‘sustainable mining’, it is more appropri-
ate to consider mining’s potential contributions to sustainable development. 
The Future We Want, the outcome document of Rio+20 (un, 2012), goes further 
in this direction as it establishes that ‘mining offers the opportunity to catalyze 
broad-based economic development, reduce poverty and assist countries in 
meeting internationally agreed development […]. [W]hen managed effectively 
and properly […] mining activities should maximize social and economic ben-
efits, as well as effectively address negative environmental and social impacts’. 
The document continues: ‘In this regard, we recognize that governments need 
strong capacities to develop, manage and regulate their mining industries, in 
the interest of sustainable development’ (un, 2012, para. 227). The sdgs have 
significant implications for mining although no explicit references are made 
to the activity (ccsi et al., 2016) and Goal 12.2 aims at achieving ‘sustainable 
management and efficient use natural resources’ by 2030. There is consider-
able debate at the international level regarding the manner in which mining 
activity—and public and private capital invested in the same—can contribute 
to financing the sdgs. In Latin America, eclac has launched a position paper 
to consolidate a new governance approach to natural resources in the region. 
The starting point is the difficulties encountered, during the boom decade, in 
reinvesting part of the economic benefits reaped in long-term strategies, hu-
man capital, or in diversifying economic activity (eclac, 2016).
Paragraph 228 of The Future We Want emphasises the role of law and poli-
cies in facilitating the economic and social contributions of mining and es-
tablishing safeguards that aim to reduce environmental and social impacts, 
conserving biodiversity and ecosystems well beyond mine closure. It also urges 
governments and companies to promote transparency and accountability, and 
existing mechanisms to work to prevent illegal financial flows from mining 
activities.
According to the Rio Declaration, the concept of sustainable development 
comprises substantive elements (integrating the environmental dimension 
into the development process; the right to development; sustainable use of 
natural resources; and intra- and intergenerational equity) and also procedural 
elements (public participation, access to information, environmental impact 
assessments (eia) and cooperation, whose objective is to legitimise and en-
hance decisions). Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell contend that international law 
undoubtedly demands that development decisions be the outcomes of a pro-
cess that promotes sustainable development (Birnie et al., 2009, 126–127). Sus-
tainable development is a process that requires  reconciling three dimensions 
Bastida and Bustos�44
<UN>
of decision-making regarding development policies and projects: environmen-
tal protection, social development and economic development. Sustainable 
development also entails effective institutions with efficient, transparent and 
participative structures as a sine qua non to achieving its objectives. It has also 
been noted that sustainable development is a transversal method of think-
ing about the law, and that it articulates a range of normative corpora (Walsh, 
2000).
The concept is broad, flexible, but rather ambiguous. The next section ana-
lyses sector legislation and the evolution of judicial decisions relative to some 
elements of the concept of sustainable development in Colombia.
4 Colombia: Mining and Sustainable Development in Legislation  
and Judicial Decisions4
Over the past two decades Colombia has been applying multiple regulatory 
and institutional reforms to promote the extractive sector. Bolstered by a 
global economic cycle favourable for commodities, the sector has gained a sig-
nificant share in the country’s economy, which has traditionally been rooted 
in agriculture or coffee. In the field of mining, coal, gold and emeralds have 
historically captured the world’s attention (Velasquez, 2013, 2014). The Code of 
Mines adopted by Law 685 of 2001 played an important role in the strategy to 
promote and attract national and international investment. The code is based 
4 We note that both the Political Constitution of Chile of 1980 and the Political Constitution 
of Peru of 1993 enshrined the principles of economic freedom, national treatment, protec-
tion of private property and guarantees of compensation in the case of expropriation (prior 
cash payment) and stipulated that the state can conduct business activities if previously 
 authorised by law (with a qualified quorum in the case of Chile). Article 19, Section 24 of 
the constitution of Chile proclaims ownership, by the state, of mines and states guidelines 
for their concession, indicating that the same are established by the Constitutional Organic 
Law. The Constitutional Organic Law on Mining Concessions that was subsequently passed, 
and the Mining Code of 1983, establishes a ‘concession-property’ regime whereby the conces-
sion is granted to the first applicant under the condition of an annual payment through a 
judicial process. The evolution of this question was similar in Peru. Following the Law to Pro-
mote Foreign Investment, of 1991, and the new constitution of 1993, Peru promoted legal and 
structural tax reforms to create the bases and incentives for foreign investment while imple-
menting a programme to privatise state companies. The Revised Single Text of the General 
 Mining Law of 1992 adopted a mining concession regime—-which exhibits similar features 
to the one in place in Chile—but whereby concessions are granted by an  administrative 
authority.
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on the principles of the public utility and social interest of mining and has ad-
opted a ‘concession-contract’ for granting mineral rights. Colombia has signed 
and ratified various bilateral agreements to promote and protect investment, 
and a number of free trade agreements.5
The National Development Plan for 2010–14 placed special emphasis on 
supporting a coherent and integrated energy and mining policy. The plan’s 
priorities included promoting both domestic and foreign investment in the 
mining and energy sectors and establishing environmental regulatory policies, 
and it focused specifically on transparency and preventing negative macro-
economic effects. The plan considered the need to strengthen efforts to create 
clusters for services and goods that add value to the economy of the coun-
try and its regions (Mancero and Montoya, 2012). The National Development 
Plan 2014–18, adopted in 2015,6 establishes ‘strategic areas reserved for mining’, 
which will be identified by the National Mining Authority (anm), classified 
according to their high mineral potential and the minerals that are considered 
as being of ‘strategic interest’ for the country. The system for granting rights to 
these  areas is differentiated from the regime established in the Code of Mines. 
It is based on Special Exploration and Exploitation Contracts, to be regulated 
by the national government and to which specific rules and obligations might 
apply. The Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development is expected 
to collaborate in this process.
In terms of mining institutions, the Ministry of Mines and the anm are 
responsible for entering into, and monitoring, mining concession contracts. 
In environmental affairs, the National Agency for Environmental Licenses 
(anla) and some autonomous, regional corporations oversee the issuance of 
environmental permits and licenses to exploit mining resources and are re-
sponsible for monitoring and enforcement. Some of these institutions have 
5 The bilateral investment agreements include those struck with China and the United King-
dom; additionally, Colombia is a member of the World Trade Organization and of the Ande-
an Community of Nations. It is also party to free trade agreements with the European Union, 
Canada, the Northern Triangle, Chile, the United States and Mexico (oas, 2015).
6 The plan is directed at ‘building a peaceful, equitable and educated Colombia in harmo-
ny with the objectives of the national government, with best practices and international 
 standards and with a vision for long-term planning as foreseen in the objectives of sustain-
able development’ (Colombia, 2015, our transl.). In terms of mining, it establishes additional 
requirements to prove the economic capacity to grant mining titles and assign rights and 
 areas. It also includes incorporating the obligation to develop and execute social manage-




responsibilities at the project level as determined by rules for territorial juris-
diction, products and export volumes.7
The Political Constitution of Colombia of 1991 states that Colombia is a 
 ‘social state under the rule of law, organized in the form of a unitary decentral-
ized Republic, with autonomous territorial entities. It is democratic, partici-
pative and pluralist…’ (Colombia, 1991, Art. 1). The constitution sets the bases 
for the regulatory role of the state in a ‘social market economy’ for the free 
exercise of economic activity and entrepreneurship and guarantees private 
property (which is considered as a social function with an inherent ecological 
function). It has been observed that the constitution introduced transforma-
tional  changes into the legal as well as the political and economic structure of 
the country in a context marked by centralism, conflict and inequality. These 
changes  included the principles of a unitary state and territorial autonomy, 
which have drawn a new ‘territorial morphology’, and the creation of the Con-
stitutional Court to uphold the extensive charter of rights and guarantees (Ro-
bledo Silva, 2016).
The constitution established the bases of a development model that placed 
emphasis on using natural resources within the conceptual framework and 
the principles of sustainable development—with a focus on the treatment of 
 non-renewable natural resources.8 The state’s recognition of the ownership 
of  non-renewable natural resources is framed within the general provisions 
for the bases of the economic regime (title xii). The mandate for developing 
subsoil resources is based on the objectives set in Article 334, which deals with 
improving the quality of life of citizens and equitably distributing the oppor-
tunities and benefits of development as well as preserving a healthy environ-
ment. To accomplish this, the exploitation of these resources should accrue 
revenues for the state that must be distributed, controlled and earmarked for 
specific purposes.9 Article 360 includes a mandate to determine by law the 
7 Other institutions are in charge of planning in the sector and its development from a geosci-
entific point of view: the Colombian Geological Service and the Energy and Mining Planning 
Unit. The activities of these two State entities support the decisions made with regard to the 
mining sector in the Ministry of Mines and Energy (upme, 2015).
8 Intervention of the Mining and Energy Department of the Universidad Externado de Colom-
bia with reference to judgment C-619/15 on 30 September 2015 (not published).
9 In this regard, article 360 indicates that: ‘The exploitation of a non-renewable natural 
 resource shall give rise to an economic offset in the form of concession fees (regalía) for the 
benefit of the State, without prejudice to any other right or compensation which might be 
agreed upon’. The Law will determine the conditions that govern non-renewable resource 
exploitation. At the government’s initiative by means of another law, the law will determine 
the distribution, objectives, purposes, administration, execution, control, efficient use and 
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conditions for the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources as well as 
the rights of the territorial entities over them and establishes a royalty as an 
economic consideration for their exploitation.
The Constitutional Court has ruled that the purpose of revenues accrued 
to the state from the exploitation of non-renewable resources is to finance the 
social, economic and environmental development of territorial entities and to 
fund physical investment in education, science, technology and innovation, 
among other areas. This is aligned with the declaration that mining is of pub-
lic and social utility, as enshrined in the Code of Mines (judgment C-395 of 
2012).10 Judgement C-1071 of 2003 interprets that royalties are grounded in both 
economic reasons (as a consideration for exploiting an asset owned by the 
state) and ecological reasons: ‘to correct and compensate for some of the nega-
tive externalities generated as a result of the exploitation of  non-renewable 
resources’.11
The Colombian constitution acknowledges the right of all individuals to a 
healthy environment as well as the right of communities to participate in de-
cisions that affect them (Art. 79). The constitution sets a clear mandate for 
the state in terms of planning to manage and use natural resources in a way 
that ‘to guarantee their sustainable development, conservation, restoration, or 
 replacement’ (Art. 80).
The Code of Mines stipulates that promoting the exploration and develop-
ment of mineral resources constitutes a matter of public interest and indicates 
that the same should be aligned with the principles and norms of the  rational 
destination of revenues from the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources, 
specifying the conditions that govern the participation of the recipients. This set of rev-
enues, allocations, bodies, procedures and regulations constitute the General System of 
Royalties.
10 Article 361 stipulates that the revenues ‘shall be used for the financing of projects for 
the social, economic and ecological development of the territorial entities; for savings to 
meet their pension obligations; for material investments in education and investments 
in science, technology and innovation; for generating public savings; for the control of 
the exploration and exploitation of deposits and the study and geological mapping of the 
subsoil; and for increasing the general competitiveness of the economy in the attempt to 
improve the social conditions of the population’ (Colombia, 1991).
11 Ruling Judgment C-1071 of 2003: ‘In economic and geological terms, the royalties that the 
State can charge for the exploitation of private resources are based on the need to correct 
and compensate for some of the negative externalities that result from the exploitation 
of non-renewable resources. In addition to the aforementioned, the rationale for royal-
ties that private parties pay for the exploitation of State resources may have an additional 
foundation which is constitutionally admissible, which is the requirement to pay com-
pensation for the exploitation of State property’ (our transl.).
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exploitation of non-renewable natural resources within the comprehen-
sive concept of sustainable development (Art. 1). In a more direct reference, 
 Article 194 establishes that ‘[the] duty to adequately manage renewable natu-
ral resources and the integrity and enjoyment of the environment are com-
patible and concurrent with the need to promote and rationally develop the 
use of mineral resources as basic components of the national economy and 
social well-being. This principle encourages the adoption and application of 
regulations, measures and decisions that regulate the interaction of two types 
of activity, which are equally defined by the law as of public utility and social 
interest’ (emphasis added, our transl.).
4.1 The Environmental Dimension
In environmental matters, the Colombian legal system contains multiple 
norms that regulate mining activities and set conditions as to the rights de-
rived from concessions. The obligations outlined in the Code of Mines should 
be interpreted in a manner that considers other legal and regulatory norms 
pertaining to this activity, such as Law 99 of 1993, which requires the issuing 
of environmental licenses as a condition to exercising rights.12 The Constitu-
tional Court, in its judgement C-891-2002, sets forth that ‘Article 59 requires the 
concessionaire to meet legal, technical, operational and environmental obliga-
tions when exercising concession rights’.13
While the mining authority is responsible for assessing a project’s technical 
and economic feasibility, the environmental authority evaluates its social and 
environmental feasibility throughout the mining cycle. This is a significant chal-
lenge for the authorities, given that effective protection and  adequate natural 
resource development will ultimately depend on a process of coordination.14
Likewise, a set of norms—namely, the National System of Protected  Areas 
(created through Decree 2372 of 2010) and Law 1450 of 2011 exclude  areas 
12 Intervention, Department of Mining and Energy of the Universidad Externado de Colom-
bia with reference to Judgement C-619/15 of 30 September 2015 (not published).
13 The Judgement states: ‘In relation to the last of these reasons, it would be absurd to sus-
tain a contrary position, as it would lead one to include in the different legal regimes, 
regardless of the subject-matter, the list of constitutional mandates applicable to each 
specific case (e.g. abide by the Constitution and the law, respect and obey authorities, 
protect the cultural and natural wealth of the Nation, respect the life of others, do not 
discriminate against anyone, act in good faith, etc.). Obviously, such interpretation un-
dermines the principles of hermeneutics, legal theory and legislative techniques among 
others’ (our transl.).
14 Intervention, Department of Mining and Energy and Environmental Law of the Universi-
dad Externado of Colombia regarding File D-11172—Constitutional Court (not published).
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from mining due to their ecological importance. The purpose of this is to 
protect  these areas, which include regional national parks, moorlands, the 
Ramsar  wetlands and protected forest reserves (Alvarez, 2011; sinap, 2015; 
Ricaurte, 2013).15
The National Development Plan 2014–18 also establishes a rule for terri-
torial ordering, as it bans areas that are classified as moorlands or wetlands 
from being declared as reserves for mining development—except if authorisa-
tions had been granted prior to 16 June 2011 in the case of hydrocarbon activity 
and prior to 9 February 2010 in the case of mining activities that have been 
 granted a contract and an environmental license or an equivalent instrument 
for environmental monitoring and management.16 In Judgement C-035 of 2016, 
the Constitutional Court upheld a claim that challenged the constitutional-
ity of the sections of the National Development Plan that backed mining and 
 hydrocarbon exploitation with permits that had previously been issued for 
moorlands, as these activities would cause negative and irreversible conse-
quences for the country’s ecosystems, which are paramount to the safeguard-
ing of the planet’s water and oxygen. The Constitutional Court ruled that the 
right to a healthy environment prevails over rights acquired through mining 
rights and endorsed by environmental permits.
4.2 Ethnic Communities: Rights of Preference and Prior Consultation  
as Fundamental Rights
The Code of Mines crystallises the rights recognised in the constitution,17 
and establishes ethnic communities’ priority with regard to granting mining 
 concessions within areas that are delimited as ‘indigenous mining areas’ or 
‘black communities’ mining areas’ (Articles 124 and 133). If the priority is not 
exercised, the code establishes the obligation to provide for such communities’ 
protection and participation and for the principle of cultural integrity, as set 
15 Intervention, Department of Mining and Energy of the Universidad Externado de Colom-
bia regarding ruling C-619/15 of 30 September 2015 (not published).
16 According to the Mechanisms for Moorlands Information (mip), an initiative of the 
Consortium for Sustainable Development of the Andean Moorlands (condesan), in 
the framework of the Andean Moorlands Projects (ppa), a moorland is a ‘tropical eco-
system in the mountains that develops on top of a forest and extends to the perpetual 
snow. In the Andes, the moorlands are extend from the Merida Range and cross through 
the mountainous chains of Colombia and Ecuador until the Huancabamba Depression 
(Peru)’ (our transl.).
17 See the extensive and detailed analysis of legislation and jurisprudence on this matter in 
Henao and Gonzalez Espinosa (2016) and DPLF and Oxfam (2011).
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forth in Chapter xiv of the code. Artisanal mining in Chocó, for example, has 
traditionally been carried out within black communities’ councils (consejos) 
in accordance with rules of allocation, and refrains from using chemical sub-
stances in the recovery process. Practices have been streamlined with envi-
ronmental and social practices agreed upon with civil society organisations. 
In the case of operations certified by the Oro Verde programme through the 
Fair Trade, Fair Mined label, miners obtain a premium on their production 
(Moya Mena, 2016). In terms of exercising indigenous and afro-descendant 
communities’ right to free, prior and informed consultation, the set of norms 
and  principles known by Colombian jurisprudence as the ‘constitutional-
ity block’ has recognised the same as a fundamental right and has reinforced 
the state’s duty to provide guarantees and protection. These norms include 
constitutional principles, Convention 169—which was included in the do-
mestic legal system through Law 21 of 1991, laws such as Law 99 of 1993, and 
the judicial decisions of the Constitutional Court (see judgements C-030/08 
and C-461/08 among others). Judicial decisions tend to expand the margins of 
protection of ethnic communities (Suarez Ricaurte, 2016), and the obligation 
to conduct prior  consultation, which is clearly established in legislation for 
the exploitation stage and in some cases also for the exploration stage (Rodrí-
guez, 2014). The standard of protection demanded of mining projects is high 
given the characteristics of this activity and its impact on territories. At this 
point, the trend seems to be moving towards requiring consultation, at least in 
some cases, to obtain consent. In effect, the theory of prior consultation as a 
means of  obtaining free, prior and informed consent has been applied by the 
Court in two  cases relative to mining projects, out of the three to which this 
standard has been applied (judgement T-769 of 2009 and T-129 of 2011; Suárez 
Ricaurte, 2016).
Despite developments in judicial decisions, the literature points to delays 
from the executive and legislative powers—which are those responsible for 
establishing models for natural resource development, management and 
planning—in their advance towards the mandatory and binding enforce-
ment of prior consultation. Measures should include strengthening insti-
tutional guarantees to indigenous communities to effectively protect their 
rights, and  establishing public policies to improve their quality of life, thereby 
 coordinating the relevant powers of public authorities (Suarez Ricaurte, 2016; 
Moya Mena, 2016; Hurtado Mora, 2016). Suarez Ricaurte (2016) observes that 
the mechanism for prior consultation is ultimately an avenue for intercultural 
dialogue. Whenever absent, it prompts persistent judicial conflict involving 
companies or state entities with investment projects located in the ancestral 
territories of ethnic communities.
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4.3 Territorial Management and Local Competences
The participation of territorial entities in land-use decisions with regard to 
mining has prompted significant debate in Colombia.18 The spectrum of the 
debate is very broad, reflecting the tension between the principle of a unitary 
state and the principle of territorial autonomy. In several judgements, the Con-
stitutional Court has considered the constitutionality of Article 37 of the Code 
of Mines, and dealt with the competence of regional, sectional or local author-
ities to temporarily or permanently ban mining from zones of the territory. We 
will now look more closely at three of these judgements to provide an insight 
into this important debate.
The first, judgement C-123-14, considered that Article 37 of the Code of 
Mines disproportionately restricts local autonomy and land use, thereby in-
fringing the concept of local autonomy. On those grounds, the Court ruled that 
the constitutionality of Article 37 is subject to guaranteeing municipalities 
and districts a reasonable level of participation in the decision-making pro-
cess regarding the authorisation of mining activities. In connection with the 
concept of ‘reasonable participation’, the Court decided that in the process of 
the authorisation of mining activities, the state should coordinate with mu-
nicipal authorities through agreements, particularly with regard to protecting 
watersheds, the health of the population and the economic, social and cultural 
development of its communities by applying the principles of coordination, 
concurrence and subsidiarity. The judgement also mandated the develop-
ment of processes and instruments of coordination. Although this decision 
provided sufficient grounds for the participation of territorial entities, it did 
not settle the underlying problem of the instrumentalisation of ‘reasonable 
 participation’ (Colombia, 2016a).
The second judgement is judgement C-273/16 of the Constitutional Court, 
which once again deals with a claim challenging the constitutionality of 
 Article 37 of the Code of Mines—in this case on procedural grounds. The claim 
argued that this Article ran contrary to Articles 151 and 288 of the Political Con-
stitution of Colombia, which place limits on the exercise of legislative activi-
ties and establish a special procedure to enact laws with regard to aspects that 
demand legislators ponder two diverging legal rights. In other words, the claim 
questioned Article 37 as it entered into the Colombian legal system as an ordi-
nary law and not as an organic law, which would require more rigorous proce-
dures (absolute majorities) as they deal with highly sensitive issues for society.
The Constitutional Court indicated that the ‘reserve of organic law con-
stitutes a mechanism that empowers the legislator to ponder diverging legal 
18 Regarding the trend towards decentralisation in Colombia, see Yupari (2005).
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rights based on the principles of subsidiarity, concurrence and coordination…’, 
and thus, considering the final objective of guaranteeing more stability in the 
distribution of powers and strengthening the democratic process of decision-
making by mandating absolute majorities for the approval of this type of law, 
the Court declared Article 37 of Law 685 of 2001 unconstitutional.
The third judgement, T-445/16 of the Constitutional Court, reaffirms the rea-
soning of judgement C-273/16. Ruling on the popular consultation proposed by 
the municipality of Pijao in the department of Quindío, the judgement  signals 
an important departure from the prerogative of decision over subsoil re- 
sources traditionally granted at a central level, as it clearly acknowledges pow-
ers to territorial entities to approve mining exploitation in their territories.
In conclusion, by means of these judgements, Colombia has apparently 
granted powers to regional, sectional and local authorities to define and sub-
sequently exclude areas of the national territory from mining. This does not 
mean that in the future the national government will not decide to regulate 
this issue through an organic law that fulfils the requirements set by the Con-
stitutional Court, thus attempting once again to empower central government.
4.4 Declaration of the Public Utility and Social Interest of the Mining 
Industry
Article 13 of the Mining Code stipulates that ‘[in] reference to article 58 of the 
Political Constitution, the mining industry in all of its branches and phases 
is recognised as of public utility and social interest. As such, at the request of 
the interested party and through the procedures established in this code, it is 
possible to decree expropriations of immovable properties and other rights 
over the same where necessary to execute and efficiently develop a project’ 
(our transl.).
As a corollary to the aforementioned debates, a recent claim challenged the 
constitutionality of the declaration of the public utility of mining established 
under Article 13 of the Code of Mines. It contended that this classification—
which was categorised as ‘supra-inclusive’ inasmuch as it refers to ‘all of [the] 
branches and phases’ of the industry—confers privileges to this sector, and 
offers it disproportionate advantages over other sectors of the economy that 
are equally as legitimate, and should have legal rights that enjoy special pro-
tection under the constitution.19 The claim also argued that this declaration of 
public utility makes possible the automatic allocation of real estate properties, 
19 Constitutional Court Judgement, C-619 of 30 September 2015; M.P. Gloria Stella Ortiz 
Delgado; plaintiffs: Cesar Rodriguez Garavito, Beatriz Botero Arcila and Camila Soto 
Mourraille.
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which might otherwise fulfil important environmental functions (for example, 
protecting water and agricultural resources or conserving natural resources), 
to mining, thereby impeding property from fulfilling the ecological function 
foreseen under Article 58 of the constitution.20
Consequently, such a state of affairs would infringe the special status of the 
environment in the legal system and would disregard the duty of the state to 
protect the natural wealth of the nation. The claim also argued that the decla-
ration of the public utility of mining runs counter to constitutional tenets that 
uphold the constitutional rights and obligations of territorial entities to man-
age their interests autonomously and to regulate land use on their  territories.21 
Although the Constitutional Court declared that it was unable to rule in this 
case given that the charges had been inadequately formulated (judgement 
C-619/2015), the claim generated debate among a range of stakeholders, who 
expressed their opinions alongside the positions argued by government agen-
cies and organisations during the judicial process. The declaration of inhibi-
tion paves the way for further constitutional debate in the future, as the initial 
parties as well as other citizens, participate. This makes it likely that the pres-
ent debate will continue under constitutional jurisdiction for years to come.22
5 The Local Institutions ‘Gap’
A review of developments in Colombian legislation and judicial decisions 
shows that sustainable development is ‘present’ in sectoral legislation: mining 
20 It is important to note that Article 58 guarantees the private property and rights that are 
acquired in accordance with civil laws. This article also stipulates that ‘When in the ap-
plication of a law enacted for reasons of public utility or social interest a conflict between 
the rights of individuals and the interests recognized by the law arises, the private interest 
shall yield to the public or social interest. Property has a social dimension which implies 
obligations. As such, an ecological dimension is inherent to it. The State shall protect and 
promote associative and joint forms of property. Expropriation may be carried out for 
reasons of public utility or social interest defined by the legislature, subject to a judicial 
decision and prior compensation. The compensation shall be determined by taking into 
account the interests of the community and of the individual concerned’.
21 Lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Article 13 of Law 685 of 2001, the Code of 
Mines, by which the mining industry, in all of its areas and phases, is deemed to be of  public 
utility and social interest. See: Dejusticia, http://www.dejusticia.org/files/r2_actividades 
_recursos/fi_name_recurso.702.pdf (accessed on 2 January 2016).
22 Judgement C-619/15, http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/RELATORIA/2015/C-619-15 
.htm (accessed on 20 January 2016).
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activity must be executed in the framework of the comprehensive concept of 
sustainable development enshrined in the constitution and in the law. This in-
cludes substantive commitments and obligations, as well as procedures inher-
ent to the limits established to protect and adequately use natural resources 
and meet the needs of present and future generations.23 This requires using 
management and planning tools such as eia and territorial planning. It also 
implies weighing interests in the decision-making process, which entails en-
tering into an intercultural dialogue with affected communities and agree-
ments with territorial units to ensure that actions in different spheres of the 
state are coordinated and directed at achieving the common good.
From the perspective of territorial management design, Santaella Quintero 
(2016) contends that the proliferation of social and inter-institutional con-
flicts regarding the granting of mineral rights is related to the fact that min-
ing legislation and environmental regulation, and the concurrent jurisdiction 
 recognised under the constitution to authorities at different administrative 
levels (national, departmental, municipal) to manage territories and their 
resources are not aligned (the so-called constitutionalisation gap). Santaella 
Quintero also points out the fragmentation of the different legal regimes that 
govern each of them (the so-called legal harmonisation gap). Along these lines, 
he observes that placing sectoral legislation in the ‘territorial toolbox’ of the 
constitution (and in the division of powers inherent to territorial autonomy) 
disrupts the dynamic of ‘top-down’ decisions. And he argues that ‘sectoral leg-
islation should be “constitutionalised” in terms of territorial management and 
harmonised with other “sub-systems”, taking into consideration the criteria 
for concurrence and the coordination of corresponding administrative orders 
and citizen participation in the decisions that affect the community according 
to the provisions of the constitution regarding the territory and its resources’ 
(Santaella Quintero, 2016, 207, our transl.).
If we widen the geographic and temporal perspective of our analysis, we 
 begin to wonder whether what we could call, in a broader sense, a ‘local institu-
tions gap’ was not originated during the very design of the legal and institution-
al regime for the sector, as we pointed out at the beginning of this chapter. In 
terms of both the historical origins of legislation and of the reforms employed 
to promote the sector in the 1990s, the sectoral regime has been directed at set-
ting stable and attractive bases for investment. Efforts directed at creating local 
institutions via which to strengthen decision-making processes and linkages to 
other productive activities have been more gradual, tenuous and fragmented. 
23 Intervention of the Department of Mining and Energy of the Universidad Externado de 
Colombia with reference to Judgement C-619/15 of 30 September 2015 (not published).
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Foreign companies carry out their operations within this space, devoid of regu-
lation and institutions and have often been filling the gaps with international 
standards and certification processes (Szablowski, 2007). The fragmentation 
of jurisdictional levels (both national and local) and of regulatory regimes, 
combined with the absence of coordination mechanisms, has heightened the 
chances that projects to which mineral rights have been granted will be unable 
to make progress towards exercising the same (such as in cases where mineral 
rights holders are denied environmental permits), paving the way for poten-
tial claims made to international arbitration tribunals. Thus, the question is 
whether legal and institutional design is sufficient to promote the role that 
mining can play in contributing to the objectives of sustainable development.
The next section provides a preliminary overview of the constitutional and 
legal framework for mining in Bolivia and poses a series of questions based on 
these reflections.
6 Bolivia: Mining in the Constitution (2009) and in the New Mining 
and Metallurgy Law (2014)
Both Bolivia and Ecuador evolved along a path similar to Peru’s in the 1990s 
by adopting legal and institutional frameworks to promote and protect for-
eign investment. The Mining Code of Bolivia of 1997 constitutes the most 
rounded version of its time of mining legislation geared towards creating en-
abling frameworks for investment. It established a single concession system for 
 exploration and exploitation (similar to the situation in Peru) under the sole 
condition of paying an annual fee, and guaranteed expropriation of surface 
lands.
The administration of Evo Morales, who took office in 2005, proposed a 
fundamental change that expressed the identity of the indigenous majority 
of the population and the objectives and functions of the state. The Political 
Constitution of the State of Bolivia of 2009 sets forth the principle of ‘living 
well’/suma qamaña as the ethos for a plural society and the state’s objectives 
and functions. Suma qamaña includes a series of principles with indigenous 
roots that anchor the constitution within the country’s pluricultural identity 
(Villalba, 2013).
The history of Bolivia has been marked by mining, which still constitutes a 
strategic activity for the country. Bolivia produces tin, lead, zinc, gold, silver, 
tungsten and bismuth and has large deposits of lithium and iron. Mining coop-
eratives play an important role in the sector. The National Development Plan 
published in 2006 envisaged a role for the sector in a strategy of ‘ comprehensive 
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and diversified development’ according to constitutional guidelines and set its 
programmatic bases (Bolivia, 2006).24
In terms of its constitutional structure, the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
is constituted as a ‘Unitary Social State of Plurinational Communitarian Law, 
free, independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralised and 
with several autonomies. Bolivia is founded on plurality and on political, eco-
nomic, juridical, cultural and linguistic pluralism in the integration process of 
the country’ (Bolivia, 2009, Art. 1). Bolivia adopts a ‘participatory democratic, 
representative and communal form of government, with equal conditions for 
men and women’ (Art. 11.i). In terms of economic organisation, the constitu-
tion enshrines a plural economic model (state, community, private) where 
the state must ensure ‘development through the equitable redistribution of 
economic surplus in the social policies of health, education, culture, and the 
re-investment in productive economic development’ (Art. 306.v.). Natural re-
sources play a pre-eminent role in the state’s economic organisation and in 
the model for a plural economy. The state must also exercise strategic control 
over the production of these resources and industrialisation chains. Natural 
resources (which include minerals in all of their states) are the ‘… property of 
the Bolivian people and shall be managed by the state’ (Art. 311.2) and are con-
sidered of ‘strategic character and of public importance for the development 
of the country’ (Art. 348.ii.). Activities related to non-renewable natural re-
sources ‘shall have the character of state necessity and public utility’ (Art. 356).
Various constitutional clauses strengthen the direct link between the 
planned and responsible use of natural resources and their industrialisation 
and the objectives of eradicating poverty and social exclusion. The state must 
explicitly recognise and prioritise this, and execute policies with that purpose 
‘within the framework of respect for individual rights, as well as the rights 
of the peoples and nations’ (Art. 313) and articulating ‘productive develop-
ment of the industrialization of natural resources’ (Art. 316; also Arts 319 and 
355). Industrial processes should preferably take place in the location where 
 production originates. Revenues derived from exploitation and the industri-
alisation of natural resources should be distributed and reinvested to promote 
economic diversification at the different territorial levels of the state (Art. 355).
The constitution sets some guidelines for the role of public companies, the 
legal instruments for the participation of private equity companies, the incor-
poration of mixed enterprises, and for entering into joint venture contracts 
for activities involving strategic resources. In terms of foreign investment, the 
24 The Government approved a new plan through Law 786, Plan de desarrollo económico y 
social 2016–2020 en el marco del desarrollo integral para vivir bien (Bolivia, 2016).
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new constitution establishes precedence of domestic over foreign investment 
and the precedence of Bolivian jurisdiction, laws and authorities in settling 
disputes (Art. 320). Bolivia withdrew from the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (icsid)—of which it had been a member since 
1991—with notice being submitted to the World Bank on 2 May 2007.
The powers of the state in terms of natural resource management are re-
stricted by the duty of the state to ‘conserve, protect and use natural resources 
and the biodiversity in a sustainable manner, as well as to maintain the equi-
librium of the environment’ (Art. 342; also Art. 358). The Framework Law of 
Mother Earth and Holistic Development for Living Well (Bolivia, 2012) es-
tablishes criteria for the use of ‘Mother Earth’s non-renewable components’. 
 Administrative and judicial public authorities are responsible for overseeing 
the rights of Mother Earth in accordance with their competences.
In terms of mining and metallurgy, the constitution delves into the regime of 
the ownership and granting of mineral rights throughout the entire productive 
chain and the use of mining contracts that must fulfil a social and economic 
function. The Law of Mining and Metallurgy establishes the regime applicable 
to mineral rights and includes actions aimed at promoting the development of 
mining and metallurgic activities in a manner that is ‘responsible, planned and 
sustainable’. The law determines the institutional structure of state authori-
ties and so-called ‘productive mining actors’ (state and private mining industry 
and cooperatives) and the procedures applicable to mining jurisdiction. Min-
ing contracts require the approval of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly.25 
Mineral rights holders can obtain surface rights in the area stipulated by the 
contract or in neighbouring areas by prior agreement and upon the payment 
of compensation. If no agreement is reached with regard to non-public lands, 
administrative authorisation will be sought from the pertinent departmental 
or regional authority.
In addition to assuming roles as a regulator and an administrator of the 
resources owned by the Bolivian people, the state plays a leading role as a 
productive actor in the mining industry. The executive branch can set areas 
aside through a Supreme Decree that allows prospecting, exploration and as-
sessment for a maximum of five years; preferably to be granted to comibol. 
25 The rights and obligations derived from contracts cannot be assigned. Applications for 
the granting of new contracts must include work and investment plans (but not technical 
or financial conditions) according to Article 140. The mandatory clauses to be included 
in these contracts are references to work and investment plans, periodic monitoring, and 
stipulations relative to protecting and preserving the environment, local work forces and 
national services (Art. 143).
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Public mining companies engage in activities involving minerals declared to 
be strategic, such as lithium and potassium.
6.1 The Environmental Dimension
The Mining and Metallurgy Law sets principles for natural resource use 
 (Bolivia, 2014). The principle of ‘social responsibility’ governs ‘the use of miner-
al resources within a sustainable development framework with the purpose of 
improving Bolivians’ quality of life’. According to the principle of ‘reciprocity 
with Mother Earth’, ‘mining activities should adhere to the framework estab-
lished in the Political Constitution of the State [Bolivia, 2009], the Framework 
Law of Mother Earth and Holistic Development for Living Well [Bolivia, 2012] 
and other applicable legal norms’ and take measures to ‘Protect Highly Vulner-
able Indigenous Nations and Peoples’ (Art. 5). The Mining Law is thus subject 
to the limits and processes established in the Framework Law of Mother Earth.
The Mining Law establishes that promoting the comprehensive and diversi-
fied use of detrital mineral deposits shall not ‘infringe the use of water needed 
for life’ (Art. 12, our transl.). Another provision restricts mining near ‘headwa-
ters, lakes, rivers and reservoirs’ and stipulates that these activities should be 
subject to environmental studies with a multi-sectoral focus (Art. 93.iii).
6.2 Territory Management and the Role of the Autonomous, Municipal, 
Departmental State
The constitution stipulates that the territorial morphology of the state is uni-
tary and decentralised and that it has autonomies (Art.1); territorially, it is or-
ganised into departments, provinces, municipalities and indigenous native 
peasant territories (Bolivia, 2009, Art. 269).
The central level of government has exclusionary competence (cannot be 
transferred or delegated) on matters related to hydrocarbons and with regard 
to the creation, control and administration of strategic public companies, 
and exclusive competence for strategic natural resources, including minerals 
 (exclusive competence in that it can exercise legislative, regulatory and execu-
tive powers, but it can also transfer and delegate the last two) (Bolivia, 2009, 
Arts. 297 and 298). In terms of the environment, the central government’s com-
petence is concurrent with that of the autonomous territorial entities.
The Framework Law of Autonomy and Decentralisation ‘Andrés Ibáñez’ 
(Bolivia, 2015), which was passed on 19 July 2010, regulates the regime appli-
cable to autonomies according to the mandate of Article 271 of the constitu-
tion. It acknowledges the power of native peasant indigenous communities 
to become territorial units—if they decide to become native peasant indig-
enous  autonomies—upon fulfilling all legal requirements. The constitution 
 recognises that peasant indigenous autonomies can exercise self-governance 
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pursuant to ‘their norms, institutions, authorities and procedures’. Their 
 establishment is based on the existence of ancestral lands and on the will of 
their population, expressed through prior consultation, in accordance with the 
constitution and the law (Bolivia, 2009, Arts. 289 and 290). These autonomies 
have the exclusive competence to develop and execute mechanisms for free, 
prior and informed consultation. The literature has observed that institutions 
of self-governance actually become subject, in practice, to the competence 
structure established by the constitution, and exhibit a remarkable influence 
exerted by known municipal statutes (rather than being the outcome of their 
‘norms, institutions, authorities and procedures’ (Tockman, 2016; Tockman 
et al., 2015).
The Mining and Metallurgy Law (Bolivia, 2014) clearly establishes that as 
mineral resources are strategic in nature, and strategic public mining compa-
nies have exclusionary competence at the central government level accord-
ing to the Political Constitution of the State, ‘autonomous departmental and 
municipal governments are not allowed to create departmental, regional and/
or municipal mining units or companies and may not participate in activities 
involving prospecting, exploration, exploitation, benefit or concentration, 
smelting or refining and commercialization’. In terms of activities of ‘transfor-
mation’ of minerals and metals (a term used in the Mining Law) for industrial 
purposes, the central government can work with autonomous, departmental, 
and municipal governments through intergovernmental public companies. 
Autonomous, departmental, and municipal governments receive a mining 
 royalty that respects the percentages established in said law (Bolivia, 2014, 
Art. 23, our transl.).
6.3 Prior Consultation
Indigenous peoples’ rights that are recognised by the constitution include the 
right to mandatory prior consultation—pursuant to their own procedures and 
institutions in a process led by the state—with regard to the exploitation of 
non-renewable resources in their territories (Bolivia, 2009, Art. 30.ii.15). It is 
important to note that Bolivia was the first country to adopt legislation that 
recognises the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(Bolivia, 2007). The 2005 Hydrocarbons Law includes the right to consultation 
and participation and recognises a direct tax in favour of indigenous peoples 
(collections accrue to the Development Fund for Indigenous Native Peoples 
and Peasants). Supreme Decree 29033 sets the rules for prior consultation.26
26 See a detailed analysis of legislation, jurisprudence and cases of implementation in dplf 
and Oxfam (2011) and Ameller et al. (2012).
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The Mining and Metallurgy Law includes constitutional consultation prin-
ciples. Article 19 (in the chapter on Fundamental Provisions) establishes that 
‘Indigenous Native Peasant Nations and Peoples have the right to participate 
in the profits generated by mineral resource exploitation in their territories 
in  accordance with the regulatory mining regime notwithstanding other 
 measures and compensation that apply under the prior consultation regime 
established in this Law’ (our transl.). The law includes a section that contains 
the provisions and procedures that must be applied to the prior, free and in-
formed consultation led by the state with ‘indigenous native peasant nations 
and peoples, intercultural communities and the Afro-Bolivian people’. Prior 
consultation is a collective and fundamental right that is inherently manda-
tory and is a ‘process of intra-cultural and inter-cultural dialogue’ conducted 
with respect to applications for new administrative contracts during the ex-
ploitation phase of projects, whenever they might directly affect collective 
rights (Bolivia, 2014, Arts. 207 and 208).
By mid-2013, approximately 30 consultation projects had been undertak-
en relative to hydrocarbon projects. This helped develop the methodologi-
cal aspects of the procedures, facilitated efforts to put together documents 
for public information, and generated capacities at the local level to better 
 understand environmental and social impacts (Bolivia, 2013). Nevertheless, 
different  sources have pointed out the difficulties that arise due to the fact that 
consultation processes focus mostly on compensation aspects (Bolivia, 2013; 
Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor, 2016). Findings emerging from field studies 
on these consultation processes also indicate their limitations with regard to 
reaping effective, meaningful benefits for the communities concerned. Obsta-
cles stem from asymmetries of power, hindrances regarding communication, 
budget constraints (Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor, 2016), the short time span 
for executing investments in the field, and a lack of attention paid to impacts 
and to complaints raised (dplf and Oxfam, 2011).
6.4 Some Reflections
Bolivia has chosen a heterodox model to organise its economy and the constitu-
tion aims to align it with the principles of suma qamaña. The critical  literature 
has observed the contradictions inherent in an economy with a strong depen-
dence on extractive activities but with the ethos of suma qamaña, which extols 
unity between man and nature.
In the context of this chapter, we are interested in highlighting the pres-
ence of the concept of sustainable development in sectoral economic legisla-
tion, at least in constitutional and legislative texts. The new legal instruments 
 attempt to align, in principle, their functions and objectives with sustainable 
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 development within the processes for participation and governance estab-
lished in the constitution and specific to the Bolivian context. Nevertheless, in 
line with the comments made in the previous section, it also seems pertinent 
to pose a question with regard to the extent to which the government is design-
ing or implementing the institutional mechanisms needed to interweave the 
Mining and Metallurgy Law (Bolivia, 2014) and the complex territorial frame-
work (and legal pluralism) drawn up by the constitution in order to ensure 
that decision-making processes are effectively anchored in sustainable devel-
opment. An initial review of the literature that has observed the application of 
prior consultation and the efforts made to establish indigenous native peasant 
autonomies in the field provides a glimpse of the enormous complexity, obsta-
cles and challenges faced when seeking to effectively ensure that the rights of 
the most vulnerable will be protected in decision-making processes relative to 
strategic economic activities (Cameron, 2013; Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor, 
2016). This also sheds light on the need to strengthen local capacities for effec-
tive participation.
7 Towards Sustainable Management of Mining and Minerals?
Our study has provided a perspective on the path from sectoral regimes fo-
cused on the granting of rights and setting conditions for exploration and 
 exploitation towards decision-making processes that require a comprehensive 
and inclusive look at the constitutional principles and legal frameworks ap-
plicable to managing territories and their resources. The challenges are very 
complex. They indicate the need to work on the gaps in the design of legal 
and institutional frameworks, and on strengthening the capacities of the in-
stitutions and actors that participate in decision-making for the sustainable 
 management of resources and for ensuring that mining contributes to sus-
tainable development at the local level. From a broader perspective, the study 
allows one to appreciate the enormous challenges faced when seeking to ef-
fectively anchor the principles and concepts found in international normative 
frameworks within the legal and political contexts and trajectories of each 
country.
From a legal standpoint, the principle of territorial sovereignty, as an essen-
tial attribute of the state, defines the power of each state to exercise control 
over the natural resources located in its territory. At the international level, the 
principle of permanent sovereignty of natural resources, enshrined in United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 in 1962, sets forth that the ‘right of 
peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
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resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and 
of the well-being of the people of the State concerned’ (un, 1962, 1). In his 
classic book Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, 
Nico Schrijver notes the evolution of the principle, from a political claim for 
the self-determination of peoples, emerging in the context of decolonisation 
and of the political and economic sovereignty of the period, to a principle 
of international law. The author points out the need to recalibrate the initial 
emphasis on rights to control natural resources towards duties for their use 
(Schrijver, 1997; also see Dam-de Jong, 2015). In this regard, the concept of 
sustainable development establishes guidelines, requirements and processes 
that place conditions on the manner in which the state exercises sovereignty 
over natural resources (e.g. opening spaces for dialogue and agreement in 
order to promote both the exercise of indigenous peoples’ fundamental right 
to prior consultation and collaboration between different administrative bod-
ies). The question is then whether the design of the legal and institutional 
framework, and the capacities to engage in processes of intercultural and in-
terdisciplinary dialogue and of managing sustainable development are suffi-
cient to ensure that states can effectively meet their duties within the sphere 
of domestic law.
Designing platforms and structures that promote the contribution of min-
ing to sustainable development requires more than thinking from a territo-
rial and local level alone. It also entails crystallising state policies to ensure 
transparency and accountability with regard to revenues, the reinvestment of 
revenues, and the transformation of non-renewable resources into other forms 
of capital (concepts that have already been explicitly or implicitly recognised 
in legal texts and in judicial decisions). Overall, this demands countries be ac-
tors and active participants in (and not just recipients of) regional and global 
processes for resource governance in order to take on the challenges raised by 
the sdgs for 2030.
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